The Seven Category Ontology Reaffirmed

Keynote Respondent: Ramprasad Chakravarthi

The six categories of being of Pra≈õastapƒÅda (substance, quality, motion, differentiator, universal, inherence), together with the category of non-being, constitute the ontology of classical Vai≈õe·π£ika metaphysics. RaghunƒÅtha ≈öiroma·πái, the sixteenth century peer of Caitanya in Navadvƒ´pa, put pressure on the classical system, arguing in favour of a radical expansion to include eight new categories: power (≈õakti), ownedness (svatva), moment (k·π£a·πáa), causehood (kƒÅra·πáatva), effecthood (kƒÅryatva), number (sa·πÉkhyƒÅ), the qualifying relation pertaining to absence (vai≈õi·π£·π≠ya), and contentness (vi·π£ayatƒÅ). In the seventeenth century, however, there was a reaffirmation of the seven category ontology in the work of thinkers like MƒÅdhavadeva Bha·π≠·π≠a and JayarƒÅma PancƒÅnana. I will examine the philosophical significance of this reaffirmation. I will argue that RaghunƒÅtha’s expansion is based on a commitment to a form of non-reductive realism. What the seventeenth century philosophers introduce is a new concept of realism, one which defends the compossibility of reduction and realism with respect to some type of entity. This ‘sophisticated realism’ (Dummett) is what makes it possible for the reality of entities in RaghunƒÅtha’s new categories to be acknowledged, but combined with an affirmation of the seven category metaphysics. I will ask whether it is nevertheless the case that RaghunƒÅtha was right to think that there are types of property irreducible to those admitted in the traditional system.

Part of the Shivdasani Conference 2009: Thinking Inside the Box - The Concept of a Category in Indian Philosophy